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The two studies that have just been pre-
sented afford an opportunity to compare
the results obtained from two methods of
research. The first study proceeded by
setting up a large number of value dimen-
sions with discriminated value positions
within each, by systematically sampling the
content of selected Soviet periodicals, and
by recording the value positions being
taken by the members of several elites. Dr.
Dunham pursued the method of the sensi-
tive literary critic reading between the lines
for intimations of the value positions of the
authors. Both studies were part of the same
project and were planned to complement
each other.
Two frames of reference in Dr. Dun-
ham’s material help to identify the point
where comparison can be made. She
speaks of three generations: the first, or
revolutionary, generation, now almost gone,
with its philosophical conviction and its
idealism; the middle, or Stalinist, genera-
tion now filling most of the high posts in
Party and government, with its habituation
to a tight, authoritarian system; and finally,
the third, or youthful, generation, with its
discontents and probing questions, now
rising to challenge the second. The other
frame of reference consists of the three time
periods that Dr. Dunham suggests: the
&dquo;thaw&dquo; just before the period when the con-
tent analysis began on May 1, 1957; the
period of tightening up from May, 1957
until December, 1958; and the period of
moderate relaxation from then to the end
of our study on April 30, 1960. Dr. Dun-
ham’s analysis is concerned mostly with the
relationship of the third to the middle gen-
eration, especially in the third period. In
terms of the elites distinguished in my
study, her analysis is particularly concerned
with the relation of the cultural elite of
that third generation to the government-
Party elite of the middle generation.
Before we go into matters of substance,
it may be worth asking whether there is
any validation of the significance of the
time periods outlined. For only 11 of the
40 categories were there enough data on
the Soviet side to make the separation of
the second and third periods meaningful.
Tables were in fact prepared making this
division but they have not been presented
because December 1, 1958 did not seem
to be an important turning point. There
did turn out to be more coded items per
issue of a periodical after that date, indi-
cating that elite members felt freer to talk
about value preferences than they had be-
fore. Furthermore, there was slightly more
criticism by the government Party elite of
other elites before than after that date, and
some tendency for more positive injunctions
after than before. These trends might indi-
cate a substitution of the carrot for the
stick.
Only Dr. Dunham’s analysis of the two
Khrushchev statements gives us direct evi-
dence of the change in attitude of the gov-
ernment-Party elite itself from our first to
our second period. She feels that whereas
in 1957 he had insisted on tight control,
the 1959 statement indicates that he is set-
tling for a division of labor that would dele-
gate to the cultural elite the job of handling
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its own problems. This is accompanied by
greater emphasis on his part on justice in
the measures adopted to reach societal goals
(evidence Kazakhstan), by greater respect
for privacy, and by more willingness to
allow criticism of the regime. Unfortunate-
ly, there were not enough coded materials
on the Soviet side in any of these three
dimensions to make the break into time
periods worthwhile. We have, therefore,
no means of validating Dr. Dunham’s be-
lief that the government-Party elite became
more permissive on these dimensions after
December 1, 1958, than it had been the
year and a half preceding.
Although Dr. Dunham makes no claim
that the restiveness with things as they are,
which she detects in the younger poets and
novelists, is stronger after December 1,
1958, one might expect such restiveness to
achieve more expression then if that was
indeed a period of greater permissiveness.
The data from the content analysis give
very little support to this hypothesis. For
only one of six dimensions relevant to pos-
sible restiveness for which we had data
enough to make a time split was there
any indication of change from one period
to the other.
This generally negative result is, how-
ever, not at all conclusive. It may be that
this restiveness cannot be expected to show
in public discussion but only in private
discussion and in the sort of veiled or
oblique manner in which one detects it in
creative literature. There is another way to
get at the matter, and that is to compare
the preferences of the cultural elite with
those of the government-Party elite through-
out our whole three-year period.
One of the strongest urges that Dr. Dun-
ham finds among young writers is for more
untrammeled expression. This corresponds
to our dimension Degree of Freedom of
Thought in Political and Social Affairs. In
Table 21 there is support for her finding.
Eighteen of the 20 departures from the
Party line are on the part of the cultural
elite. A related dimension is Degree of
Criticism of Means, but perhaps one not
so dear to the heart of the creative artist.
Here again there is confirmation. Eight of
the nine really dissident preferences in Table
23 were expressed by the cultural elite.
Again, Indoctrination of Youth would seem
to be a relevant dimension. Table 25 gives
us no confirmation, however. Similar small
proportions of the cultural and government-
Party elites hold that nonpolitical agencies
should have chief responsibility for indoc-
trination.
Another aspect of the criticism by the
younger members of the cultural elite found
by Dr. Dunham was directed at the ma-
terialism of Soviet society. We have two
dimensions that are relevant: Criteria for
Social Status, and Ends of the Society.
Table 24 shows only a slightly greater pref-
erence by the cultural elite than by the
government-Party elite for more respect
for intellectual, artistic, and spiritual
achievement, but on Ends of the Society the
evidence is overwhelming. In Table 27,
70 percent of all preferences expressed by
the cultural elite are for more emphasis on
intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual achieve-
ment, whereas the corresponding figure for
the government-Party elite is only nine per-
cent. The cultural elite is evidently much
more concerned about the direction its so-
ciety is taking than about its own prestige.
Four of our dimensions touch upon as-
pects of the governmental and societal
structures that Dr. Dunham believes to be
unacceptable to the young literati: Integra-
tion or Separation of Political Functions,
Locus of Public Decision-Making, Unitary
or Pluralistic Society, and Relation of Means
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to Ends in the Achievement of the Good
Society. On the first of these, no member
of the cultural elite took a deviant position
(Table 14). But on the second, the mem-
bers of the cultural elite differentiate them-
selves sharply from the government Party
elite (Table 16). Since this bears quite
directly on the split between the &dquo;we&dquo; and
the &dquo;they&dquo; that Dr. Dunham mentions, there
is real confirmation here. Oddly enough, the
cultural elite seems not to favor a pluralistic
society any more than does the govern-
ment-Party elite (Table 12). With respect
to concern for the justice of means (Table
46, Appendix C, p. 423) there is so little
evidence from the cultural elite that no con-
clusions can be drawn.
There are other aspects to the imputed
dissatisfaction with the collective. One of
them is the resentment of lack of privacy,
and another is the notion that long-term,
large-scale planning dwarfs the individual
and neglects his dignity. Table 42 (Appen-
dix C) gives us no help on the first aspect
for lack of data, and Table 5 fails to show
any resentment in the cultural elite at in-
clusive planning.
Two other dimensions with which Dr.
Dunham’s findings need to be compared
are Young and Old in the Society and Risk-
Taking. She believes (1) that the young
writers wish to see more accent on youth
(the third generation wishes to get out from
the straitjacket fitted by the second genera-
tion) and (2) that they are willing to take
risks to achieve the good society. There
is no evidence for the first proposition in
Table 45 (Appendix C), but the second is
confirmed in Table 26, though the data are
few.
Finally, Dr. Dunham found a great dread
of war reflected in Soviet literature, though
it is not certain that the writers were ex-
pressing their own view or merely mirroring
that of the people. Anyway, Table 34 does
not show that this fear is more marked in
the cultural elite than elsewhere. There is
no deviation from the Party line in any
elite.
Of the 14 dimensions that seemed to us
relevant to the preferences of the younger
members of the cultural elite as found by
Dr. Dunham in their writings, the results
in five are clearly confirmed and in six are
not. In three there is not enough evidence
or it is only slightly positive. The five con-
firmations come from quite different areas:
freedom of thought and criticism; empha-
sis on intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual
ends; participation in decision-making; and
willingness to take risks. This-together
with the fact that the government-Party
elite never took a more permissive position
than the cultural elite-lends a good deal
of general support to the notion that there
is indeed some ferment at work. There are
two other considerations that make it likely
that our tables understate rather than over-
state the matter. The most powerful mem-
bers of the cultural elite are the older men
of the middle generation. They would be
the ones whose preferences would be more
likely expressed in the nonliterary periodi-
cals than would those of the writers of the
third generation. And, more generally, it
takes courage for anyone to deviate from
the Party line, so that one would not expect
the full extent of any cleavage between the
government-Party and the cultural elite to
show.
Besides the points on which we could
make direct comparisons through our di-
mensions, Dr. Dunham made other obser.
vations of interest. One was that the third
generation is full both of idealism and of
cynicism. Some are turning back to the
enthusiasm of the first generation and ask-
ing for the realization of the dream that
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somehow got lost. Others are disenchanted
with their society and are not sure that life
has any meaning. They have decided
simply to look out for number one. It is
the former who are willing to take the risks
to achieve a better life. They, too, are the
ones who are saying that trust must replace
distrust and that control by fear is no longer
good enough.
A related theme that may be even more
significant is that young writers are feeling
shame and guilt at some of the things that
have been done. The thought that all the
people created Stalin, the shame at the
plight of the peasants, and the feelings of
guilt at their own perquisites are indications
that the government-Party elite would find
it hard indeed to reimpose a Stalinist sys-
tem.
The great contribution of Dr. Dunham’s
analysis is not in telling us what the cultur-
al elite is willing to say explicitly in its
own name-we know that from our 40
tables. Rather, it is in pointing out what
the younger members of this elite are prob-
ably feeling that they hesitate to express
openly. Their characters speak for them.
Thus we get at a deeper level of preference.
In trying to fit these results into the
larger context of Soviet-American relations,
the question of how powerful the cultural
elite is becomes crucial. Granted that its
positions are to some degree in opposition
to some of the elements of Soviet society,
is their point of view likely to be influential
in the future and to put pressures on the
government Party elite that have to be
heeded? Certainly the answer to this ques-
tion partly depends on how much the cul-
tural elite is expressing merely its own long-
ings and how much it is representative of
a much broader segment of the Soviet pop-
ulation. Our materials do not make possible
a judgment on this point.
But one statement can be made. The
Soviet society has become highly literate
and its people do read fiction and poetry
voraciously. Thus, whether or not the
people now share value preferences of the
cultural elite, they are and will continue to
be exposed to them. This in itself consti-
tutes some pressure on the government-
Party elite. At least they will have to
explain why they do not follow the lines
suggested in creative literature. In the ab-
sence of equally strong counterpressures
from some other elite-say the economic
or the military-we may assume that the
government-Party elite will be influenced
somewhat by the sorts of preferences that
Dr. Dunham’s analysis uncovers.
The upshot of the whole matter is that
we have a present position, exposed to us
in our statistical tables, and a possible, per-
haps probable, direction of future modifi-
cations, as revealed by the characters created
by the younger writers. Does this direction
of possible future modification suggest any
annotations to our summaries of the three
sets of dimensions?
Reexamination of the summary of the
economic dimensions shows little need for
change. The cultural elite comments little
on property matters or even level of re-
wards and does not seem to be pushing for
any great changes here, though Dr. Dunham
thought she detected some mistrust of in-
clusive planning. If this does develop, it
would only increase the overlap on this
dimension already present because of Amer-
ican willingness to adopt widespread plan-
ning.
Of the dimensions relating to social and
internal political affairs, there were 11 that
showed overlap or convergence. Dr. Dun-
ham’s analysis has nothing to say about four
of these, but it tends to reinforce the con-
vergence on seven of them. The analysis
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of literature strongly suggests that the slight
present overlap in the dimension Locus of
Public Decision-Making is likely to increase.
The responsibility for policy-making may
have to be diffused somewhat. In connec-
tion with Table 42 (Appendix C) it was
noted that some of the cosmopolitan elite
were being criticized for taking a Soviet-
like attitude on surveillance; Dr. Dunham’s
material suggests that some members of the
Soviet cultural elite would like to take an
American-like attitude. The convergence
already found on Degree of Criticism of
Means is now clearly reinforced. Our peri-
odical analysis showed some willingness on
the part of American elites to have the
government indoctrinate youth, and thus
they overlap the Soviet elites. The material
from creative literature suggests that there
will be a tendency for more of the members
of Soviet elites to break from this position.
The greater willingness of the Soviet elites
to take risks is again confirmed. On Cri-
teria for Social Status, and Ends of the
Society, the convergence already found is
reinforced, particularly on the latter.
There were nine dimensions in the social
and internal political affairs group upon
which no convergence of value preference
was found. Does the analysis of creative
literature suggest any probable change in
these situations? On five of them there is
no evidence for comparison. The nature of
the political party system, the control of
education, the criteria for scholarships, the
relation of church and state, and the rela-
tion of the mass media to the people and
the government are not explicitly treated in
Dr. Dunham’s analysis. On four others,
however, there is evidence. All of these are
closely related to the functions of writers
and to their desire for freedom of expres-
sion. The young literati are thought to be
impatient of the unitary nature of Soviet
society and to long for a more pluralistic
one; and to be unhappy with the complete
integration of political functions in their
society and to feel that more freedom of
thought both on social and political matters
and on natural science and technological
matters would be beneficial. Thus, there
may be pressure toward a more open sys-
tem in these respects that our statistical
analysis of periodicals did not uncover.
We have no material that would allow
us to make the same kind of future specu-
lations on the American side. Most observ-
ers of the American scene believe that
American value preferences will shift very
slowly since there seems not to be the same
level of discontent that is found in the
Soviet Union. Or perhaps better, the dis-
contents are due to a failure to live up to
American common values rather than to a
disbelief in the values themselves.
Since Dr. Dunham’s analysis did not deal
with the external relations of Soviet society,
we can make no comparisons on these
topics.
A final word may be said about the kinds
of information obtained by the two methods.
Each method has its peculiar dangers. In
the case of formal content analysis of peri-
odicals, there is the danger that in a coun-
try like the Soviet Union what is explicit
and therefore recorded for analysis is not
in fact the real value position of the elite in
question. It may be simply what elite mem-
bers think it is politic to say. The problem
here is the validity of the material being
coded. In the case of the interpretation of
creative literature there is the same prob-
lem. The authors may be writing what
they think the Party elite wants. There
is, however, a further danger-and Dr.
Dunham would be the first to agree-that
mistaken inferences may be made in the
interpretation of what is written.
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On the other hand, both methods have
their strengths. The systematic content
analysis does not require reading between
the lines to obtain the results sought. Once
coder reliability has been established, there
is little problem of inference. The strength
of the interpretation of creative literature
is not in its systematic quality but rather in
its ability to bypass the controls of a totali-
tarian society. Creative writers can hint at
their value preferences subtly through their
characters. If the interpreter is sufficiently
knowledgeable about the society being
studied and sufficiently sensitive to the
nuances of the material interpreted, value
positions that cannot be baldly expressed
may be successfully inferred.
There is much to be said for the employ-
ment of the two methods in the same gen-
eral project, as here. They reinforce each
other to the degree that the same value
preferences may be expressed in two dif-
ferent forms, and they complement each
other in the sense that formal content anal-
ysis of periodicals may catch better the
established value preferences, whereas the
interpretation of creative literature may
catch the incipient tendencies.
